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ANTITRUST ISSUES RAISED BY THE EMERGING 
GLOBAL INTERNET ECONOMY 
David S. Evans* 
INTRODUCTION 
Web-based businesses are increasingly the subject of antitrust con-
cerns. Plaintiffs in the United States have sued eBay for tying its online 
payments service to its transaction service.1  Multiple jurisdictions in the 
European Community have claimed that Apple has violated the competition 
laws by limiting the ability of its music player to play music from compet-
ing music stores and limiting the ability of competing music players to play 
music purchased from its music stores.2  During 2007, although the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission decided not to block Google’s acquisition of 
DoubleClick after a lengthy investigation, it expressed its intent to “closely 
watch these markets” involved in online advertising.3 
Of course, competition policymakers have not just discovered the web.  
In 1998, shortly after the start of the commercial internet three years earlier, 
the U.S. Department of Justice and various states filed an antitrust case 
against Microsoft for engaging in various practices related to web brows-
 
*
  Executive Director, Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics and Visiting Professor, 
University College London; Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.  The author would like to 
thank Howard Chang and the editors for very helpful comments on an earlier draft, Aditya Bhave, Ma-
rina Danilevsky, and Melissa DiBella for excellent research assistance, and Microsoft for financial sup-
port.  The views are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of anyone else with whom he 
is affiliated.  
1
  See, e.g., Malone v. eBay, Inc., No. 07-01882-JF (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 4, 2007). 
2
  Free-DRM Music By iTunes, But EC Starts Official Investigation, EDRI.org, Apr. 12, 2007, 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.7/ituned-free-drm; Increased Competition Pushes iTunes To-
wards Interoperability, Forbrukerombudet, Feb. 11, 2008, 
http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11038653 (link); Helena Spongenberg, Apple’s iTunes 
Risks EU Backlash After Norway Ruling, EU Observer, Jan. 25, 2007, http://euobserver.com/871/23334; 
Apple: European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute Over iTunes Music Store, Ver-
braucherzentrale, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.vzbv.de/go/dokumente/571/8/36/index.html (link); Con-
sumer Council of Norway, Complaint against iTunes Music Store (Jan. 25, 2006), 
http://forbrukerportalen.no/filearchive/Complaint%20against%20iTunes%20Music%20Store.pdf (link). 
3
  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Concerning Google/DoubleClick, Dec. 20, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf (link).   
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ers.4  The European Commission started an investigation of Microsoft’s 
practices related to media players that stream music over the internet in 
2001.5  However, the Microsoft cases mainly involved the use of the com-
pany’s market power in personal computers to influence competition in 
web-based markets that threatened it.  The matters involving Apple, 
Google, and eBay concern market power in web-based products and ser-
vices themselves. 
The internet economy is likely to raise antitrust concerns—and possi-
ble demands for regulation—for years to come.  Global gargantuan firms 
have emerged, which will likely attract scrutiny by competition authorities 
and by policymakers concerned with competition issues.  The companies 
mentioned above, for example, have shares in putative antitrust markets that 
rival those held by Microsoft.6  Apple has more than a 70 percent share of 
paid music downloads in the European Union,7 Google has more than an 80 
percent share of search queries in Europe,8 and eBay has more than a 90 
percent share of auction site page views in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and the UK.9  
Competition authorities and private parties can challenge the practices 
of these leading firms under the antitrust laws of most jurisdictions.  Such 
challenges are especially likely under European Community law and deci-
sional practice which impose special obligations and significant scrutiny on 
firms that have market shares as low as 40 percent.10  Moreover, many web-
 
4
  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld in 2001 portions of a lower court ruling in 2000 that 
found Microsoft guilty of violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 
2000)). 
5
  In 2007 the European Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s 2004 decision that Micro-
soft has violated Article 82 EC by tying its media player software to its dominant operating system.  See 
T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17, 2007). 
6
  These are not necessarily relevant antitrust markets but they are ones that competition authorities 
could plausibly adopt. 
7
  See Anna Jenkinson & Don Jeffrey, Apple, Record Companies Restrict Music Sales, EU Says (Up-
date6), Bloomberg.com, Apr. 3, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aiMdS7KddG14&refer=europe (link). 
8
  COMSCORE, MYMETRIX QSEARCH 2.0 KEY MEASURES REPORT (Dec. 2007).  comScore is a 
“global Internet information provider” that gathers data on internet usage trends.  comScore Who We 
Are, http://www.comscore.com/about/default.asp (link).  comScore’s data analyses are based on its 
panel of over two million users.  Id.  In recruiting its panelists, comScore attempts to ensure that “[a]ll 
demographic segments of the online population are represented in the comScore Global Network, with 
large samples of participants in each segment.”  comScore Methodology, 
http://www.comscore.com/method/method.asp (link). 
9
  COMSCORE, MYMETRIX KEY MEASURES REPORT (Dec. 2007). 
10
  See British Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25 (finding British Air-
ways dominant in the context of Article 82 with a share of 39.7%, notwithstanding evidence that its 
share had declined from 46% over a seven year period).   
The finding in British Airways relied heavily on the fact that the rest of the market was very frag-
mented.  See id. ¶¶ 211–25.  This was the first time that a firm with a market share below 40% was 
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based firms have complex business models and arrangements.  Separating 
the merely complicated from the nefarious will take courts and competition 
authorities time to sort out.  This Essay describes the economics and tech-
nology behind the web-based economy and how these features will influ-
ence internet competition policy in the years to come. 
Section I provides a birds-eye view of the web-based economy.  Al-
though this sector is evolving quickly, its contours are beginning to take 
shape and we can be reasonably confident that several globally dominant 
firms will play significant roles.  Section II describes the economics of the 
web-based economy.  The key businesses are what economists call “multi-
sided platforms” that serve several distinct but interdependent customer 
groups. Google for example serves people who are searching the web, ad-
vertisers who want to reach these users, and application developers who are 
using Google’s software to develop complementary products. The leading 
multi-sided platforms for the web are often built on “software platform” 
technologies that make portions of their code available to software develop-
ers who write applications that benefit users of the software platform. Sec-
tion III considers the competition that arises in the web-based economy.  
The appearance of dominant firms in key sectors will ensure ongoing scru-
tiny, and the nature of the economics and technology of these businesses 
will result in ongoing disputes over their practices. 
The web economy poses two major challenges to competition authori-
ties.  The law and economics for analyzing the multi-sided platforms that 
dominate the internet sector is not well developed. At the same time the 
web-economy is evolving very rapidly and in ways that are sure to result in 
antitrust complaints and investigations. Competition authorities and courts 
will need to exercise great care in balancing the protection of consumers 
from anticompetitive behavior against causing harm from interfering in 
complex businesses that are both rapidly moving and not fully understood. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WEB-BASED ECONOMY 
The internet refers to computer networks that are linked through wired 
and wireless connections and that interoperate through standard communi-
cation protocols.  This global communication system provides access to 
various software-based services.  The most important set of services on the 
internet is the world-wide web, which consists of digital media linked 
                                                                                                                           
found to be dominant.  Subsequently, in Wanadoo Interactive, the Commission concluded that Wanadoo 
did hold a dominant position, though it only had a market share of 39%.  Wanadoo Interactive, Commis-
sion Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227 (link).  The Commission reached this finding both based on the 
size and strength of Wanadoo’s main competitors, who all had markets shares in between 6.5% and 
16%.  The Commission reached this finding both based on the size and strength of Wanadoo’s main 
competitors, who all had markets shares in between 6.5% and 16%.  Id.  The issue of thresholds for find-
ing dominance was not examined further by the CFI in Case T-339/04 France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 
2007 E.C.R. II-00521 (2007). 
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through hyperlinks and uniform resource locators (“URLs”).11  For simplic-
ity, this Essay refers to the internet as the physical communication system 
and to the web as all products and services that rely on this communication 
system. 
The key innovations behind the internet started occurring in the early 
1960s, and the key innovations behind the web came in 1989.12  The com-
mercial web began roughly in 1995 with the introduction of browsers that 
made web navigation easy for regular computer users; this therefore en-
couraged the formation of businesses geared to a mass audience.  There was 
much prognostication in the late 1990s on how the web would evolve, and 
enormous optimism that it would lead to quick fortunes as network ef-
fects—more users make a site more valuable which leads to more users—
propelled early entrants to monopolies.13  Those hopes were seemingly 
dashed in 2001, when the market caps of most web-based firms plummeted 
and vast numbers of these firms vanished.14  It became apparent that many 
of these firms had not developed business models that allowed them to 
make money from the visitors who came to their sites.  In the aftermath of 
the burst bubble, though, a robust web-based economy has emerged that is 
creating completely new services, from social networking to behaviorally 
targeted advertising, and also disrupting many traditional businesses from 
media to telephony.15  As we will see below, advertising revenue for deliv-
ering traffic has become the major driver for a significant portion of the 
web economy. 
A large portion of the population in industrialized countries touches the 
web-based economy daily.  In 2007 55 percent of the population in the 
European Union16 and 71 percent of the population in the United States had 
 
11
  Other internet services include online gaming, Voice-over-IP, email, instant messaging, file shar-
ing, and other communication services.  Most of these services are bundled into websites. 
12
  See David C. Mowery & Timothy Simcoe, Is the Internet a U.S. Invention?—An Economic and 
Technological History of Computer Networking, 31 RES. POL’Y 1369, 1371–76 (2002). 
13
  See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999) (“When the value of a product to one user depends on how many other 
users there are, economists say that this product exhibits network externalities, or network effects . . . . 
Technologies subject to strong network effects tend to exhibit long lead times followed by explosive 
growth.  The pattern results from positive feedback: as the installed base of users grows, more and more 
users find adoption worthwhile.”) (emphasis in original). 
14
  See, e.g., Suzanne McGee, New Economy Sours on Venture Capitalists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 
2001, at R.6; Easy.com easy.gone, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2001, Special Section, A Survey of the New 
Rich, at 6–9; Living in Freefall, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 117–18. 
15
  See Reply All Blog, Is ‘Web 2.0’ Another Bubble?, WSJ.com, Dec. 27, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116679843912957776.html (link). 
16
  Internet World Stats, Internet Usage in the European Union, 
http://internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm, (last visited Apr. 19, 2008) (link).  Population penetration is 
defined as the number of Internet users divided by the total population of the region.  An Internet user is 
defined as “anyone currently in the capacity to use the Internet,” namely, that he has access to an Inter-
net connection point and can use the technology.  Internet World Stats does not adjust the figures to ex-
clude children, illiterate people, or any other segment of the population. 
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access to the internet.17  In December 2007, 78 percent of all internet users 
in the United States and 69 percent worldwide used webmail;18 39 percent 
of all internet visitors in the US and 47 percent worldwide used instant mes-
saging.19 According to a year 2007 survey of Americans who frequently 
used the internet, 84 percent used a search engine.20  The same survey found 
that the average respondent spent 33 hours per week on web products and 
services in 2007 compared with 16 hours viewing television.21 
Web-based products and services are consumed primarily through the 
personal computer, which is the primary internet-connected device in most 
countries.22  However, it is widely expected that most mobile phones around 
the world will soon be connected to the internet.23  This increased portabil-
ity will increase the amount of time people can access the web because 
people usually have their mobile phones with them all the time.  It will also 
increase the use of web-based products and services in lesser developed 
countries because mobile phones are less expensive than personal com-
puters and more widely held.24 
One must be modest in speculating on the future evolution of the web.  
The internet and the web are very new technologies by historical standards.  
 
17
  Internet World Stats, Internet Penetration in North America: Nov. 2007, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north, (last visited Apr. 19, 2008) (link). 
18
  comScore Media Metrix, data for December 2007, available at 
http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/more-what-if-data-issued-on-yahoo-microsoft-combo-
3362/ (link) (follow “In the email category, Yahoo mail leads both in the US (82 million visitors) and 
worldwide (257 million visitors)” hyperlink).  
19
  Id. (follow “A Microsoft/Yahoo combined instant messenger audience of 298 million would 
reach nearly 77% of the instant messenger audience worldwide.” hyperlink) (link).   
20
  IDC, U.S. ONLINE CONSUMER BEHAVIOR SURVEY RESULTS 2007, PART I: WIRELINE INTERNET 
USAGE 1 (2007) (on file with author). 
21
  Id. at 52. 
22
  The major exceptions are Korea and Japan, where many consumers use their mobile phones to 
connect to the internet and where sophisticated web-based mobile phone services have been introduced.  
See Michael Fitzpatrick, Why Mobile Japan Leads the World: A Combination of an Urban Lifestyle and 
Infrastructure Advantages Mean that the Fixed Internet is Being Left Behind by the Mobile, THE 




  See, e.g., Press Release, Ipsos, Mobile Phones Could Soon Rival the PC As World’s Dominant 
Internet Platform (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ipsos-
na.com/news/act_hit_cntr.cfm?id=3049&Region=us&PDF_name=mr060418-1b.pdf (link); Press Re-
lease, comScore, Mobile Phone Web Users Nearly Equal PC Based Internet Users in Japan (Sept. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1742 (link); see also Darren Wa-
ters, Why the Future is in Your Hands, BBC News, Feb. 18, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250465.stm (link). 
24
  See id.  Also, cell phone unit shipments were nearly 1.2 billion units in 2007 while the number of 
PCs shipped globally was just over 270 million.  See Ann Steffora Mutschler, SIA: 2007 global chip 
sales up modestly by 3% to $256B, EDN.com, Feb. 1, 2008, 
http://www.edn.com/article/CA6527975.html?industryid=47037 (link); Press Release, Gartner, Gartner 
Says Worldwide PC Market Grew 13 Percent in 2007 (Jan. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=584210 (link). 
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One could not have reliably forecasted the development of electricity at a 
similar vantage point during its development. The recent dot.com bust 
teaches how wrong smart and financially motivated people can be about the 
business prospects of a new technology.  Nevertheless, five features of the 
web-based economy appear to have emerged that are critical for under-
standing how this industry will evolve, the competitive strategies used in 
this sector and their implications ultimately for antitrust policy.  
Many web businesses follow the traditional advertising-supported me-
dia model.  Content is used to attract traffic. Access to that traffic is sold to 
advertisers.  The content is usually made available for free so that advertis-
ing is the primary source of revenue and profits.  Many of the leading web 
properties follow this approach.   
Table 1 lists the top ten sites in the United States based on the number 
of pages of those sites that are viewed by visitors.  All but three of these 
sites are primarily supported by advertising; Amazon and eBay are funded 
through transaction mechanisms while Wikipedia is funded by voluntary 
donations.  
 
Table 1: Top 10 Properties (U.S.) January 2008. 
Rank Property Unique Visitors (in thousands) 
 Total Internet Audience25 184,239 
1 Yahoo! Sites 138,059 
2 Google Sites 134,886 
3 Microsoft Sites 119,297 
4 AOL LLC 109,442 
5 Fox Interactive Media 83,752 
6 eBay 78,789 
7 Amazon Sites 59,003 
8 Wikipedia Sites 55,589 
9 Time Warner - Excluding AOL 52,645 
10 Ask Network 52,102 
Source: Press Release, comScore, comScore Media Metrix Releases Top 50 Web 
Rankings for January (Feb. 18, 2008) at Table 3, available at 
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2067 (link).   
 
Google and Ask primarily sell advertising on their search results pages. 
AOL, Fox, Microsoft, Time Warner, and Yahoo primarily sell advertising 
on their various web properties.  The emergence of the advertising-
 
25
 Properties include all of the sites owned by an entity, including search engines, international sites 
and sites acquired.  For example, ‘Google Sites’ include google.com and other international homepages, 
search pages for specific categories such as news and images, applications such as Gmail, Google Maps 
and Google Earth, and sites owned by Google such as Picasa and YouTube.  
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supported media model for websites is one of the most significant changes 
since the dot.com bust and is the revenue source behind what is sometimes 
called Web 2.0.  
Transaction platforms play a key role.  The web has resulted in the de-
velopment of a number of transaction platforms which reduce the costs of 
connecting buyers and sellers and consummating trades between them.  
These platforms earn most of their revenues and profits from transaction 
fees.26  For example, although eBay began by helping consumers sell sec-
ond-hand goods to other consumers who wanted to buy those goods, it has 
evolved into a broad platform for connecting consumers and businesses.  
Other e-commerce sites, such as Amazon have started moving from directly 
selling merchandise on their own behalf to providing a platform for con-
necting businesses and consumers.   
Social networking is a critical innovation.  Social networking has 
emerged as a new form of communication and interaction among individu-
als.  MySpace, for example, has attracted 69 million users worldwide who 
post information about themselves on the site and use it to stay in contact 
with friends and to make new acquaintances.  A related phenomenon is that 
a great deal of the “content” on the web is generated by users.  Although 
sites such as YouTube, as well as MySpace and Facebook, rely on advertis-
ing to make money as traditional media firms do, they expend few re-
sources on actually creating or purchasing any content themselves—they 
focus mainly on inducing others to provide this content. 
Demand and supply-side scale economies tend to lead to certain seg-
ments of the web being dominated, on a national and often global basis, by 
a few large firms.27  On the demand side, some web-based platforms create 
more value for each customer as they obtain more customers.  A transaction 
platform such as eBay, for example, is more valuable to buyers because it 
has more sellers and more valuable to sellers because it has more buyers. 
 
26
  These transaction platforms usually have integrated payment platforms.  eBay has PayPal, 
Alibaba has AliPay, and Google’s commerce site has Google CheckOut.  In 2007, 25 percent of eBay’s 
net transaction revenue came from the use of its payment platform, PayPal, rather than its auction plat-
forms and communications segment (for example, Skype). 
27
  A demand-side scale economy results when a product or service becomes more valuable as more 
people use it.  Demand-side scale economies result from direct and indirect network effects.  In the case 
of direct network effects, “the benefit to a network user depends directly on how many other users are 
hooked up to the network.”  In indirect network effects, “the benefit to a user arises indirectly because 
the number of users of the network affects the price and availability of complementary products.”  See 
DENNIS W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 392–393 (4th 
ed., 2005).  Supply-side scale economies result when the long-run average total cost of providing a good 
or service fall as the quantity of output increases.  Id. at 36–40. 
The mere fact that a firm has a large share of a segment does not necessarily imply that it has scale 
economies or network effects and in fact some of the shares discussed below are likely the result of the 
fact that these firms were just better than their rivals.  However, for the reasons discussed below it is ap-
parent that indirect network effects, and to a lesser extent cost-based scale economies, are important for 
these businesses. 
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Moreover, buyers and sellers appreciate being able to reach others across 
borders. 
On the supply side, some web-based platforms—Google, for exam-
ple—also incur significant fixed costs in developing and maintaining their 
software platforms and in acquiring computer server and storage capacity 
for their activities.  The average cost of providing products and services is 
lower for larger platforms, which can amortize these fixed costs over a lar-
ger customer base.  Demand and supply-side scale economies result in lar-
ger firms being able to offer greater value to consumers at lower costs, as 
discussed in more detail below.  These scale economies do not necessarily 
result in a monopoly but they do tend to limit the number of viable firms in 
a segment.28  In some segments, it is in fact unclear how many viable firms 
will remain and whether they will evolve towards monopoly. 
Web-platforms support many web firms. These giant global web-based 
firms provide platforms for other web-based businesses.  They make soft-
ware services available so other businesses can provide complementary ser-
vices.  For example, the music service iLike.com and the online Scrabble 
platform Scrabulous are two of the most popular Facebook applications, 
raising the value of the Facebook platform as a whole.  Google makes its 
popular mapping software available to developers who are writing applica-
tions based on Google’s maps.  Web-platforms also provide services that 
these businesses rely on.  Many web-based small businesses depend on auc-
tion sites such as eBay or e-tailers such as Amazon to make sales.  Most 
blogs rely on Google to sell ad space on their sites to advertisers who want 
to reach blog viewers.29  These web-platforms are examples of the multi-
sided platforms that we describe in more detail below. The web-based busi-
nesses that rely on these platforms provide complementary products and 
services that make the web platform more valuable and help drive revenue 
to it. 
II. THE ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF WEB-BASED BUSINESSES 
A. The Economics of Multi-sided Platforms 
Many of the key businesses that have arisen on the web are what 
economists call “multi-sided platforms.”30  A multi-sided platform provides 
 
28
  As firms become larger indirect network effects and scale economies from further expansion may 
diminish and congestion and managerial economies may counter the other benefits from size.  Further-
more, multiple firms may coexist in a segment despite indirect network effects and scale economies if 
they can differentiate their products and services from each other.  
29
  See, e.g., Posting of David S. Evans to Catalyst Code, 
http://www.thecatalystcode.com/theconversation/blog/2007/08/06/economics-of-the-blogosphere/ (Aug. 
6, 2007) (link). 
30
  Multi-sided platforms are also called “two-sided markets” by economists even though they are 
not markets—at least as markets are defined in antitrust.  See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 
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goods or services to two or more distinct groups of customers who need 
each other in some way and who rely on the platform to intermediate trans-
actions between them.31  Multi-sided platforms usually lower transactions 
costs and thereby facilitate value-creating exchanges.  They tend to arise 
when there is some value available from getting multiple sides together but 
transactions costs or other obstacles stand in the way.  eBay, for example, 
drastically lowered the cost of exchange between buyers and sellers of sec-
ond-hand goods. 
Multi-sided platforms usually perform each of three interrelated core 
functions to some degree.32  First, they serve as matchmakers to facilitate 
exchange by making it easier for members of each group to find each other.  
That can be for love (matchmaker.com) or money (eBay).  Second, they 
build communities (or audiences) because this makes it more likely that 
members of a group will find a suitable match.  Facebook provides value in 
part because people are more likely to find people they want to meet and 
because advertisers can reach a large audience.  The value of the platform 
grows as the audience grows. Third, they provide shared resources and re-
duce the cost of providing services to multiple groups of customers.  This is 
an especially important characteristic of software platforms discussed be-
low. 
One key feature of multi-sided platforms is the presence of the “indi-
rect network effects” mentioned earlier.33  That means that the value that a 
customer on one side realizes from the platform increases with the number 
of customers on the other side.  Consumers looking to buy something value 
a search engine more if it provides advertisements that are more relevant to 
their search, while companies value advertising on a search engine higher if 
they are more likely to reach potential consumers.  
Another key feature is that multi-sided platforms must cater to multi-
ple, distinct customer groups simultaneously.  To establish a two-sided plat-
form, for example, the founders must solve a chicken-and-egg problem: 
customers on Side A will not participate without customers on Side B, but 
customers on Side B will not participate without customers on Side A.  
YouTube had to pursue people who want to post videos, people who want 
                                                                                                                           
Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, 
Two-Sided Markets].  Most web-based businesses are at least two-sided because they are transaction 
platforms (such as eBay, Amazon, Alibaba) which connect buyers and sellers, social networking sites 
(such as MySpace and Facebook) which connect friends, of advertising-supported sites (such as 
cnn.com as well as the social networking sites) which connect viewers and advertisers.  
31
  See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 325, 328 
(2003); David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries, 2 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 191 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. 
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003). 
32
  See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-
Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 158–59 (2007). 
33
  See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 93 (1994). 
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to watch videos, and advertisers who want to reach these viewers.  These 
features make the profit-maximizing calculus for a multi-sided platform 
more intricate than for a traditional business.  A firm operating one of these 
platforms must consider the demands of all sides, the interrelationships be-
tween these demands, the costs directly attributable to each side, and the 
costs of running the platform. 
Further complicating this calculus is the fact that the profit-maximizing 
prices for multi-sided platforms can result in users on one side getting a 
price that is less than the incremental cost incurred by a customer on that 
side, and even less than zero.34  The side that is “needed more” or that is 
“harder to get” may receive a price break; conversely, the side that gets the 
most value out of access to members of the other side likely bears more of 
the cost.35  As an empirical matter, many multi-sided platforms make their 
money from one side and make access to the platform available to another 
side for a price that does not cover the cost of provision.36  Facebook, for 
example, is free to users and makes money by selling advertising.37 
There are several major classes of industries in which most if not all of 
the businesses are based on multi-sided platforms.  These include advertis-
ing-supported media including newspapers, magazines, radio, television; 
payments including credit and debit cards; exchanges including auction 
houses, commodity exchanges and financial exchanges; and dating and 
matchmaking such as singles bars and matchmaking services.  Another ma-
jor class consists of industries that have software platforms as their underly-
ing technology.38  These include computer operating systems, mobile 
telephones, personal digital assistants, and video game consoles.39  They 
also include many web-based businesses. 
B. Software Platforms 
A software program is a “platform” if it provides services that other 
web software can rely on.  Typically a software platform includes modules 
of code that other software programs can access through application pro-
gramming interfaces (“APIs”).  By relying on these APIs software develop-
ers can obtain services that enable them to write software programs that are 
complementary to the software platform and useful to those who rely on the 
 
34
  See Rochet & Tirole Two Sided Markets, supra note 30, at 659; Mark Armstrong, Competition in 
Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668–70 (2006); Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Al-
styne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1498 
(2005). 
35
  See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CATALYST CODE: THE STRATEGIES BEHIND 
THE WORLD’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES 71–92 (2007). 
36
  When there are more than two sides, at least one side must make money.  Id.  
37
  See About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2008) (link). 
38
  See generally DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES: 
HOW SOFTWARE PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006). 
39
  See id. at 1–2. 
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software platform.  By relying on Facebook’s APIs, Scrabulous provides a 
game for Facebook users and thereby makes Facebook a more valuable so-
cial networking site for those users.40  
Historically, a major type of software platform consisted of operating 
systems that run on personal computers or on servers that are nodes in an 
organization’s network of computers.  Software applications such as Micro-
soft Word that ran on operating systems were also installed on these desk-
top or server computers.41  The software platforms that are central to web-
based businesses reside on servers that are attached to the internet.  More-
over, applications that work with these platforms may reside on other serv-
ers that are attached to the internet.  This has resulted in what is sometimes 
called “cloud” computing, in which the software platform, and possibly the 
application, primarily resides on several interchangeable computers that the 
individual user accesses through the internet.  Google’s search-based adver-
tising platform is an example.  The search engine that individuals use to 
conduct search queries, much of the software that advertisers rely on for 
advertising campaigns, and much of the software that publishers rely on for 
inserting advertisements into their web pages, reside on vast interconnected 
but indistinguishable “server farms” that Google operates around the world. 
C. The Interconnected Web Ecosystems: The Example of Google 
The economics and technology of web-based businesses has resulted in 
an ecosystem that consists of interconnecting multi-sided platform busi-
nesses—based on software platform technology—that provide services to 
each other, to many other web-businesses that depend on them, and to con-
sumers.  This pattern can be seen by starting with Google’s advertising plat-
form and considering the businesses that are connected to that node.  The 
relationships are shown in Figure 1. 
 
40
  The owners of Scrabble have objected to this take off on their game.  See Heather Timmons, 





  Operating systems are a type of software platform that manipulates the computer hardware in ad-
dition to providing code that supports other software and hardware applications. 



















Figure 1: Google’s advertising platform connections. 
 
Google’s advertising platform enables companies to insert ads based 
on keywords used in a search query, in which case the ad appears on the 
search-results page, or based on the keywords found in a website that be-
longs to Google’s network of web publishers.42  Google’s search engine 
makes money by drawing traffic to its search-results pages, where it sells 
and places advertising.  That search engine also helps people find web-
based businesses—including publishers and e-tailers—that are not paid ad-
vertisers.  Those businesses benefit from Google’s search engine, but 
Google does not charge them for being listed in the organic search results 
that appear on the left-hand side of the search-results page.  Google also 
provides advertising services to web publishers.  Those publishers make 
space available for Google to insert ads; Google sells that space to advertis-
ers and pays the publishers a portion of its ad revenues. 
Many of the entities that Google interconnects with are also multi-
sided platforms.  Web publishers operate two-sided platforms in which they 
use content to attract viewers and sell access to those viewers to advertisers.  
Many small publishers, including blogs, rely entirely on Google to sell their 
advertising space.  Many large publishers use Google to sell some portion 
of their advertising space; some of them also have Google search boxes and 
receive payments from Google for advertising revenue that results from 
 
42
  See David S. Evans, The Economics of the Online Advertising Industry (Jan. 2008) (unpublished 
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their visitors clicking on ads on Google’s search results pages.  Social net-
working sites are similar to web publishers in using advertising to make 
money.  The site attracts traffic by providing social networking and makes 
money by selling that traffic—and data related to individual users—to ad-
vertisers through platforms such as Google.  Google’s advertising platform 
also intersects with eBay’s transaction platform.  eBay buys advertising on 
Google’s search results pages to obtain leads to various products and ser-
vices on eBay.  In addition, eBay makes advertising space available to 
Google and receives payments in return. 
Google makes its APIs available to software developers that are writ-
ing programs to provide other services.  In return, Google reserves the right 
to insert advertising on those services.  Since January 2007, developers 
have written around 20,000 “gadgets”—mini-applications that use the 
Google Gadgets API and can run on Google platforms (e.g. Google Calen-
dar, iGoogle—a personalized Google homepage, Google Desktop, Blogger, 
Google Maps, Orkut), which can be embedded in any webpage, and can run 
on other third party applications (e.g. MyAOL)—which are used across 
100,000 Web sites.  Developers can also create map applications on their 
websites using the Google Maps API.  For example, using the Google Maps 
API, Orbitz added “Orbitz Updates” to its site, a map which shows real-
time user-reported weather, traffic, parking, and wait-line conditions at U.S. 
airports. 
D. Scale and Dominance in the Web-Based Economy 
The economics and technology of web-based businesses has resulted in 
the emergence of companies that have substantial shares in their categories 
in many countries globally.43  These shares are partly the result of scale 




  I am using the term “category” to refer to commonly known types of products or services such as 
social networking, portals, instant messaging, and auction-sites.  These categories do not necessarily 
correspond to markets because products and services in one category can substitute to some degree for 
products and services in another category.  Moreover, the extent of cross-category substitution can vary 
over time; for example, in my experience people are increasingly using social networking sites such as 
Facebook as their entry point when they sign on to the web rather than a traditional portal such as Ya-
hoo. 
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Table 2 reports data on the two largest platforms in three representative 
categories:44 online auctions, search-based advertising, and social network-
ing for a number of countries.45  These categories are highly concentrated in 
every country.  Moreover, the search-based advertising and online auction 
categories are dominated by the same firm in most countries for which data 
are available.  eBay is the largest auction site, with over 90 percent share of 
this category in all of countries for which individual data are available.  
Google is the leading search-engine provider with a share in excess of 80 
percent in 7 out of 16 countries for which data are available and a share in 
excess of 50 percent in 12 out of 16 countries.  Social networking does not 
have a single leader although the leading social networking site has more 
than a 50 percent share in most countries for which there are data.46 
 
44
  I have chosen these three because, as discussed below, they reflect the most important types of 
platforms for the foreseeable future.  However, the same basic points apply to instant messaging, online 
payment systems, and web mail. 
45
  These categories do not necessarily correspond to relevant antitrust markets and any analysis of 
market definition should properly consider the two-sided issues mentioned above.  As noted below, 
these shares are based on categories as reported by comScore and may over or understate the true sig-
nificance of the leading companies.  First, the shares of the main search engine providers (Google, Ya-
hoo, Microsoft, and Baidu) are understated because comScore includes searches that are done within 
websites such as eBay in its calculation of search shares, even though eBay is not generally used for 
internet searches.  Second, the calculation of search query shares further understates the search revenue 
share for Google because Google earns a higher revenue per search than  Microsoft or Yahoo.  See 
Search Marketing Communications, http://cohn.wordpress.com/category/revenue-per-visit/ (Feb 7, 
2008) (link); Miguel Helft, A Long-Delayed Ad System Has Yahoo Crossing Its Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 2007, at C1. 
46
  Facebook’s implied market value after investments by Microsoft and Chinese billionaire Li Ka-
shing is $15 billion; that suggests that at least some investors are betting that Facebook will become the 
leading social network.  See Suzy Jagger, Li Ka-shing makes big impression on Facebook, THE TIMES 
ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2008, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/technology/article3642805.ece (link); 
Thomas R. Eisenmann and Brian Feinstein, Facebook Platform, Harvard Business School Case Study 
N2-808-128 (Mar. 18, 2008), at 1. 
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Table 2. Shares of Market Leaders in Major Internet Platforms 
 
















     


















































































































































































Sources: comScore, MyMetrix Key Measures Report (Dec. 2007); comScore, My-
Metrix qSearch 2.0 Key Measures Report (Dec. 2007). 
 
Notes:  The search figures are shares as reported by comScore.  They include 
searches on web sites where searches are primarily or exclusively used to search 
within the site rather than generally on the internet.  They also include searches on 
sites where advertising is not featured.  Shares of search engines used for general 
searches on the internet and shares of search engines relevant to search advertis-
ing will likely be higher than the shares reported here.  Social networking shares 
are also as reported by comScore.  They include blogging sites such as Blogger.  If 
these sites are excluded, the shares of the market leaders would be higher. 
 
The web-economy is still young compared to other industries.  Some 
of the leading firms are not even a decade old.  It remains to be seen 
whether they maintain their leadership and the extent to which other plat-
forms, through differentiation, can survive.  Yahoo has long been a leading 
portal and advertising platform, but its market value fell 33 percent between 
January 31, 2007 and January 31, 2008.  Following this decline, Microsoft 
announced its desire to acquire Yahoo on February 1, 2008.  Despite its past 
success and enormous user base, some analysts concluded that Yahoo could 
not succeed on its own.47  Other web giants have also encountered prob-
lems.  The growth of eBay has slowed, and the company was undergoing a 
 
47
  See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Microsoft Woo Yahoo?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 12, 2008, at 
C1; Grouchy Geek, http://grouchygeek.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/02/01/yahoo-needs-microsofts-help/ 
(Feb. 1, 2008, 11:56 EST) (link); Claudine Beaumont, Fading Yahoo! Needs Microsoft rescue, THE 
TELEGRAPH, Feb 2, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/02/01/bcnmicro601.xml (link). 
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shakeup in management in early 2008.  It faces increased competition from 
Amazon, Google, and other web properties that provide transaction plat-
forms for businesses.  The capital markets have also expressed profound 
uncertainty over Google’s growth.  Its share price fell by 34 percent be-
tween January 2, 2008 and April 17, 2008, the day it announced its first 
quarter earnings.48  Google reported a 30 percent increase in quarterly prof-
its that day and its stock increased by 23 percent by April 22, 2008. 49 
III. COMPETITION AND REGULATORY POLICY 
Antitrust scrutiny of the leading web-based platforms from around the 
world was, and is, inevitable.  This scrutiny has come, so far, either through 
self-initiated investigations by competition authorities, through complaints 
by their diverse stakeholders, or through complaints by their rivals.50  These 
web-platforms have large shares of the segments in which they operate.  
While one can debate whether these segments correspond to well-defined 
antitrust markets, the competition authorities and complainants may take 
these categories as a starting point.  Under European Community law, a 
firm can be considered dominant with a share as low as 40 percent.51  Many 
of these platforms have segment shares that exceed 80 percent in many 
countries.  The European Commission suggested, in its case against Micro-
soft, that such “super-dominant firms” should receive even greater scrutiny; 
some observers believe that the Court of First Instance has agreed with the 
Commission in its Microsoft judgment.52  Under U.S. law, firms that have 
market shares in excess of 60 percent are often considered to have monop-
oly power.53  Although it has become more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail 
 
48
  See Google Finance, Google Inc., http://finance.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ:GOOG (follow 
“compare” hyperlink, then follow “Zoom: 6m” hyperlink, then track the dates and corresponding share 
prices on the graph).  In fact, Google’s stock price had been stumbling since November, 2007.  See Post-
ing of Jim Kerstetter to CNET Tech News Blog, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9920376-7.html 
(Apr. 16, 2008, 11:06 PDT) (link). 
49
  See Google Finance, supra note 48; Press Release, Google, Google Announces First Quarter 
2008 Results (April 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/revenues_q108.html (link). 
50
  In keeping with the global focus of this article “complainants” is used to refer to parties that com-
plain to a competition authority as well as plaintiffs in private actions, which is the dominant form of 
antitrust enforcement in the United States. 
51
  See British Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25; Wanadoo Interac-
tive, Commission Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227 (link).   
52
  See Renata B. Hesse, Microsoft and the Court of First Instance: What Does it All Mean?, 
GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, Oct. 3, 2007, 
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id=562&action=907 (link); Harry First, Strong 
Spine, Weak Underbelly: The CFI Microsoft Decision, GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, Sept. 28, 2007, 
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id=555&action=907 (link). 
53
  See Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Some Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Address 
Before the University of International Business and Economics Competition Law Center Conference on 
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on various monopolization theories in the United States, the case law on ty-
ing products together and offering discounts for bundles of products contin-
ues to provide significant opportunities for plaintiffs to pursue cases. 
The existence of indirect network effects and scale economies means 
these platforms are competing in “winner-take-all” and “a few winners take 
all” markets.  That leads to aggressive struggles to win market share at the 
expense of rivals.  Competition authorities worry and rivals complain, how-
ever, when “tough” business tactics succeed in reducing the rivals’ sales, 
thereby “foreclosing” them from the market.  Complicating matters, compe-
tition authorities and courts have difficulty distinguishing pro-competitive 
from anti-competitive business practices for multi-sided platforms.  For ex-
ample, as mentioned previously, multi-sided platforms often charge prices 
that are below cost to customers on one or more sides of the platform.  In 
some circumstances these low prices drive out competition as a result of 
what business strategists refer to as “envelopment.”54  Rivals who lack the 
money-making side of the platform that subsidizes the money-losing prod-
uct cannot survive.  
Several competition and regulatory issues are likely to arise in the 
coming years as a result of this antitrust scrutiny and given the probable 
evolution of the web-based economy. 
The emergence of impregnable monopolies.  There are likely to be 
concerns over the seeming monopolization of certain segments.  It is possi-
ble that the web-economy will see a constant churning of its leading play-
ers.  The fact that eBay and Yahoo have lost their once seeming 
impregnability is consistent with the view that dominance is fleeting.  How-
ever, the evolution of the web-economy thus far is also consistent with the 
evolution of other industries in which it takes time for the winners to 
emerge.55  If so, it is possible that a handful of firms will have near-
monopoly positions in certain segments and that those positions will be pro-
tected in part by indirect network effects and the scale economies resulting 
from the ability to average fixed software and hardware costs across larger 
communities.  American antitrust policy recognizes that such monopoly is 
the reward for successful investment and innovation.56  European Commu-
nity (EC)-based competition policy views competition as the more desirable 
                                                                                                                           
Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice, (July 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm. 
54
  See Thomas R. Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker & Marshal W. Van Alstyne, Platform Envelopment 
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Tech. & Operations Mgt. Unit, Working Paper No. 07-104, 2007) (manuscript at 3), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996852 (link). 
55
  See David S. Evans, Daniel D. Garcia Swartz & Bryan G. Martin-Keating, The Failure of E-
Commerce Business:  A Surprise or Not? 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.1, 7 (2002); Michael Gort & Steven 
Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations, 92 Econ. J. 630, 331 and Table 3 (1982) 
(on the decline in number of firms). 
56
  See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).  
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outcome, and when that is not possible, it imposes significant obligations on 
the dominant firm.57   
Leveraging into adjacent markets.  The structure of the web ecosystem 
makes it likely that dominant firms will seek to move into related markets 
for complementary products or services.  Because these firms are based on 
software platforms it is relatively easy to add new features and services.  
For example, Google introduced its Google Checkout payment service in 
competition with PayPal by extending its software platform, integrating 
code into Google Product Search and bundling Google Checkout for mer-
chants into AdWords for advertisers.  Moreover, the leading web platforms 
often provide complementary services.  It is a well-established economics 
proposition that a monopoly could make greater profit if it also owned 
complementary monopolies or if it could replace these complementary mo-
nopolies with competitive markets.58  Therefore, assuming that competition 
is not feasible, we would expect the dominant firms to attempt to establish 
monopolies across more segments than is true today.  That could happen 
through mergers or through one dominant firm challenging another, as 
Google is doing with eBay.   
Access to facilities.  Access to the other platforms and to the intellec-
tual property that enables one platform to work together (“interoperate”) 
with another are likely to be raised when, as is the case in the European 
Community, the law is conducive to do so.59  One set of issues concerns ac-
cess to a “closed platform.”  The Apple iTunes/iPod platform is largely 
closed.  Apple does not encourage—and indeed seeks to prevent—other 
music stores from making music available for iPods or for other device 
makers to play music from iTunes.  Although it could obtain indirect net-
work effects from an open strategy, it has chosen a tightly integrated busi-
ness software-hardware model.  This issue is central to the recent European 
Community cases against Apple.60  Other platforms close themselves in par-
 
57
  Firms that are dominant are subject to the provisos of Article 82 EC Treaty which has been inter-
preted to prohibit various forms of tying, refusals to deal, bundled price rebates, pricing below cost, and 
other activities.  See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 202–208 (5th ed., 2004) (discussing exam-
ples of abuse of dominance).  In many of these cases the practices are essentially prohibited per se if the 
firm is dominant—has a share of an antitrust market that is higher than forty percent or so.  See British 
Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25; Wanadoo Interactive, Commission 
Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227.  
58
  See Michael A. Salinger, Introduction to Chapters VII and IX of Augustin Cournot, Mathematical 
Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 4 Competition Policy Int’l 274, 280–82 (2008) (“Today, the funda-
mental distinction between horizontal and vertical effects is widely accepted by antitrust practioners.”). 
59
  The OpenGroup, a consortium that aims to facilitate interoperability, explains that interoperabil-
ity is the ability to both exchange information and to use it.  “Without a way to exchange information ... 
[sic] high-tech systems literally can’t communicate with each other.  And, if they can’t communicate, 
they can’t work—interoperate—with each other.”  The Open Group, Interoperability Matters, 
http://www.opengroup.org/bus_area/interoperability/info1/IBinfo1.htm#what, (last visited Apr. 10, 
2008). 
60
  See Keith Regan, iTunes Draws Ire of EU Commissioner, MACNEWSWORLD, Mar. 13, 2007, 
http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/56255.html (link); Eric Bangeman, EU Commissioner Criticizes 
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ticular dimensions.  Facebook, for example, does not allow search engines 
to crawl its website, and as a result, the content on this social networking 
site is not available to searchers.   
Another set of issues relates to portability of data.  Web platforms de-
rive benefits from the data they collect in a variety of ways.  eBay’s “Feed-
back Forum” provides quality information on sellers that is valuable to 
buyers.  Users input a great deal of valuable personal information into so-
cial networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook.  Google retains data 
on search queries that it can use to refine searches and deliver ads.  In these 
cases one could imagine competitors seeking access to this information un-
der an “essential facilities” theory under European Community law.61  One 
could also imagine competition policy cases over restrictions that prevent 
users from exporting their data to competing sites. This battle has already 
begun, as Facebook rivals are currently lobbying publicly for the portability 
of social networking data. 
Tying and bundling.  As the current spate of cases suggests, it is prob-
able that leading web platforms will face complaints over tying of various 
forms.62  It is also a common business strategy for software platforms to ex-
pand by adding features.  They face low marginal costs for doing so, they 
can sometimes provide efficiencies by integrating features together or mak-
ing it easier for consumers to obtain them more conveniently, and they can 
aggregate demand over users who may value one feature but not another.63  
The D.C. Court of Appeals found that it was appropriate to apply a rule-of-
                                                                                                                           
iPod-iTunes Tie-in, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 11, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070311-eu-
commissioner-criticizes-ipod-itunes-tie-in.html (link). 
61
   “[T]he essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential 
facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain 
in order to compete with the first.”  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th 
Cir. 1991).  For a review of the implementation of the essential facilities doctrine by the European Un-
ion, see James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179 (2005) 
(link). 
62
  For example, in September 2007, The European Court of First Instance (CFI) upheld the Euro-
pean Commission’s accusations against Microsoft of illegal tying of the Windows Client PC Operating 
System and Windows Media Player.  See Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 ECJ CELEX 
LEXIS 554 (Sept. 14, 2007).  Further, in January 2008, the Commission opened an investigation into the 
alleged tying of Internet Explorer and other software products to the Windows PC operating system. See 
Memorandum from the European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Initiates Formal Investigations 
Against Microsoft in Two Cases of Suspected Abuse of Dominant Market Position (Jan. 14, 2008) 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/19.  The Commission 
has also censured Apple for its tying of the iPod music player and the iTunes Music Store.  See Regan, 
supra note 60; Bangeman, supra note 60. 
63
  See EVANS, HAGIU & SCHMALENSEE (2006), supra note  38, at ch. 11.  Demand aggregation is 
most easily seen with newspapers: many people only read portions of the newspapers; however, by of-
fering various features readers find enough content to persuade them to subscribe to the newspaper. 
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reason legal standard to tying for software platforms64 because of the possi-
bility that there were particularly compelling efficiency explanations for the 
practice in this situation.65  Whether the U.S. courts treat the web-based 
companies as software platforms, however, remains to be seen; these com-
panies have different business models and practices than Microsoft did with 
Windows, which was the subject of the D.C. Circuit decision.  Moreover, 
the European Community’s Court of First Instance has re-affirmed the 
Community’s formalistic approach to tying in the Microsoft judgment.66 
Envelopment and predation.  Multi-sided platforms are a bit like 
clumsy giants stepping on other creatures as they move through the ecosys-
tem.  Although they may crush competitors intentionally, this may also 
happen as a natural byproduct of legitimate pricing and design decisions.  
Multi-sided platforms—and this is particularly true with the leading web 
platforms—give many features and services away, often for the purpose of 
attracting traffic.  They can readily crush companies that charge for features 
and services they offer for free.  But it is not only the little guy that faces 
concern from this strategy.  Google Checkout can undercut eBay’s PayPal 
because Google, unlike eBay, can obtain more advertising revenue from 
having an efficient payment method and can secure data that it can use to 
target ads better.  Likewise, Google’s ability to subsidize software with ad-
vertising poses a threat to Microsoft and other software companies that 
charge for software; Microsoft is moving rapidly into online advertising just 
so that it can have a source of revenue similar to a key rival.  Nevertheless, 
one would expect that tying, bundling and pricing strategies that foreclose 
rivals will lead to competition policy investigations and prosecutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the inception of most new industries, hundreds of firms enter.67  
They battle it out over time.  A few winners usually emerge—firms that 
have secured scale economies or that have benefited from superior man-
agement or both.  This pattern has been repeated numerous times over the 
course of the second industrial revolution that started after the U.S. Civil 
War. Consider the automobile industry.  It began with the invention of the 
automobile by Karl Benz in 1885.  The first commercial automobile com-
pany in the United States was Duryea, which entered the market in 1893.  
As of 1908, 253 automobile companies were competing in the U.S.  This 
 
64
   “A rule-of-reason analysis requires first checking whether the facts of a given case suggest that 
anti-competitive tying is a possibility and then weighing those anti-competitive effects with the benefits 
resulting from a tying policy.”  See David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla & Michele Polo, Tying in Platform 
Software: Reasons for a Rule-of-Reason Standard in European Competition Law, 25 WORLD 
COMPETITION 509, 514 (2002). 
65
  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
66
  See Christian Ahlborn & David S. Evans, The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for the 
Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe, ANTITRUST L. J., (forthcoming 2008). 
67
  See Gort & Klepper, supra note 55 at 631. 
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was whittled down to the big four—General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and 
American Motors—by 1960.  Many other industries followed a similar 
course. 
Antitrust scrutiny often follows consolidation.  The leaders in the in-
dustry have large market shares, which, under longstanding antitrust prac-
tice, makes them vulnerable to claims of unlawfully maintaining or 
acquiring a monopoly or running afoul of other antitrust laws that have a 
market power screen.  AT&T was hit with its first major antitrust case in 
1911, twenty-six years after it opened the first telephone exchange.  IBM 
faced its first antitrust case forty-seven years after it received patents for the 
punch card machine.  
We can expect the web-based industries will follow the same trajec-
tory, and thus far they have.  Massive entry has taken place.  As with many 
new industries, we remember the YouTubes that succeeded but we forget 
that Google Video and hundreds of other start-ups tried and quickly failed.  
There are some differences, though, which suggest more antitrust contro-
versy will result, sooner.  The first is speed.  Although the notion of “Inter-
net Time” may have been exaggerated, it is true that web-based firms can 
achieve leading positions in many countries around the world very quickly.  
The second is complexity.  Almost all of the leading web-based firms have 
intricate multi-sided business models.  The third is interconnectedness.  The 
web-economy is interconnected, which leads to dependencies and rivalries 
that can create conflict and antitrust complaints.  
As a result, the competition authorities and courts will have a challeng-
ing set of issues to deal with concerning the web-based economy in the 
years to come.  The future will bring merger cases as firms seek to consoli-
date to achieve economies of scale and indirect network effects; refusal-to-
deal cases as closed platforms deny others access to their communities; pre-
dation cases as rivals complain about “free” offerings that foreclose if not 
destroy them; tying cases as platforms use software platform technologies 
to add features and functions which in some cases will foreclose their ri-
vals; and exclusive dealing cases as platforms lock up traffic to achieve in-
direct network effects.  Courts and competition authorities should exercise 
care in balancing the need to protect long-run social welfare against the 
need to stop anti-competitive strategies in this highly dynamic and complex 
part of the economy. 
 
 
